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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to analyze an optimal pricing rule for the
case in which the costs of price adjustment are time dependent, and where
those costs depend positively on the magnitude of the percentage price
change. By means of discrete time model, it is shown that the optimal
response to the problem under consideration is to pre—set prices for each
period at the end of the previous period. Within the period prices will
adjust if the unexpected shock exceeds a threshold level. En such a case the
new price is established at a level that is a weighted average of the pre—set
level and of the equilibrium level that would have obtained in the absence of
costs of contemporaneous price adjustment. Under certain conditions, which
are derived in the paper, higher volatility of unexpected inflation might
reduce relative price volatility.
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(215) 898—74091.Introduction and Summary
In a recent paper Sheshinski and Weiss (1983) have analyzed the optimal
price adjustment rule for a producer having market power and facing a fixed
cost of price adjustment. Their contribution has demonstrated that the
adjustment rule is of the (S, s) type, and that higher volatility of inflation
would accompany a higher volatility of relative prices. The purpose of the
present paper is to analyze optimal pricing rules for the case where the costs
of price adjustment are time dependent, and where those costs depend
positively on the magnitude of the percentage price change. Two economic
considerations motivate these modifications. First, we expect that the cost
of an unexpected price adjustment would exceed that of a price adjustment that
is anticipated well ahead of time, because in the latter casemoretime is
available to adjust plans. Next, as Rotemberg (1982) has argued '...under
imperfect information consumers will tend to cater to firms with relatively
stable price paths and avoid those firms which change their prices often and
by large amounts...". Thus, the presumption is that consumers benefit from a
more stable price structure. We capture this notion by imposing costs of
price adjustment that depend on the magnitude of the price change.
Rotemberg (1982) and Sheshinski and Weiss (1983) postulate costs of price
adjustment that are time independent. This paper modifies their analysis by
assessing how time—dependent costs of price adjustment modify the pricing
behavior of a producer. By means of a discrete time model, is shown that for
the case analyzed in the paper optimal behavior requires pre—setting prices
for each period at their certainty—equivalence level. Within the period,
—1—prices will adjust if the unexpected price—level change exceeds a threshold
value. When this happens, the price moves to a level that corresponds to a
weighted average of the pre—set prices and the price that would have obtained
in the absence of costs of contemporaneous price adjustment. The weights and
the threshold value justifying price adjustment have a simple representation
as functions of the underlying parameters. Unlike the case analyzed by
Sheshinski and Weiss (1983), under certain conditions higher volatility of
unexpected inflation might reduce relative price volatility.1 Necessary
conditions are high volatility of inflation and small marginal costs of price
adjustment.
The analysis also demonstrates that the elasticity of price volatility
with respect to inflation volatility exceeds one. The reason for both results
is that higher inflation volatility leads to more frequent contemporaneous
price adjustment.
The paper is organized in the following manner. Section 2 describes the
model, Section 3 derives the optimal pricing rule. Section 4 offers
concluding remarks. The Appendix summarizes the notation used in the paper.
2. The Model
Starting with the case in which prices are fully flexible provides us
with a benchmark for subsequent discussion. Flexible prices occur if the cost
of contemporaneous price changes is nil, and if consumers attach no value to
price stability. Consider in such an economy a producer of good x facing a




—2—where and correspond to the price level and the price of good x in
period t. The producer is facing a given price level. To simplify
exposition, the analysis is conducted for the case where marginal costs of
production are zero. The approach described In the paper can be applied also
for the case where labor Is a variable input.
Direct optimization reveals that the equilibrium price is given by:
*- A
(2)p=p+in
where lower case letters (p, )denotethe logarithms of P, P,and
stands for the equilibrium price. Let denote real profits that correspond
to the optimal price p •Ifthe producer charges price P instead of
p ,profitscan be approximated by
* *2
(3) ir(p) =111 — r2(t
—p)
where it2correspondsto the absolute value of the second term of the Taylor
expansion of real profits around p •Fromeq. 1 we obtain that:
2
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Wewould like to introduce price rigidity by using a modified version of
Rotetnberg's (1982) framework. Like Rotemberg, we assume two types of costs.
One is a fixed cost per price change, denoted by c. The other is a cost that
relates to the reputation of the seller. The presumption is that consumers
—3--benefit from a more stable price structure. We capture this notion by
Imposing a cost that is quadratic in the percentage change of prices. Unlike
Rotemberg (1982) and SheshInski and Weiss (1983), we assume that costs of
price adjustment are time dependent. The presumption is that changes in
prices that are known well ahead of time would impose lesser adjustment costs
than unexpected, last minute changes because in the former case there is more
time to adjust plans. This assumption is a natural extension of the notion
that unexpected inflation imposes higher adjustment costs and welfare loss
than anticipated inflation.
Asimplewayofintroducing these considerationsiS toassume that price
changes for period t are costless if they are made ahead of time (i.e., before
period t). Price changes impose costs if they are made within the period (at
time t), because they can not be foreseen (at time t1).
In such an environment the producer pre—sets prices for period t at the
end of period t-1, at a (logarithmic) level p .Undercertain conditions he
would change prices within the period to p .Derivingoptimal p and
Is the topic of Section 3.Let Pt denote the actual price of x in period t,
and R(p) the real profits that correspond to price Pt .Weassume that
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The specification of R(p) is a key step in our discussion. If the price
of x does not adjust within the period, it will deviate by — fromthe
price that maximizes real profits in a flexible equilibrium case. Thus, we
—4—can use equation 3 to find that profits are given by ir(p°). Had the price
adjusted within the period to p ,undera flexible equilibrium profits would
be rr(p').Becausewithin—the—period price adjustment imposes costs, we
should adjust profits rr(p) by the costs of price adjustment. Those costs
are the fixed cost, c, and depend also on the magnitude of the percentage
change. This is captured by the quadratic term (p0 —p')2where
I p —pcorresponds to the percentage change of the price of x relative to
its pre—set level. In the next Section we derive the properties of
0
PtPt
3. Optimal Pricing Policy
Optimal pricing policy should provide us with three rules: the optimal
price to change if we decide to make a price adjustment within the period
(p); the switching conditions under which we would update prices within the
period; and the optimal pre—set price (p). We derive the policy in three
corresponding steps. First, for a given p we derive optimal p .Next,
for a given p and the corresponding optimal value ofp we find the
conditions under which we would decide to update the price of x within the
period (optimal switching rule). Lastly, subject to optimal p and the
optimal switching rule, we find the optimal value of p° •Wethen use the
optimal pricing rule to study the properties of the resulting variances of the 4i
absolutYEi relative prices of x.
Consider first the case in which for a given p° we decide to change the
price of x within the period to p .Wewould set p so as to maximize the
resulting profits, R(p).This is achieved if (see equation 5)
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Thenew price corresponds to a weighted average of the pre—set and the
flexible prices. Higher costs of marginal price adjustment Cd c > 0) would
shift the resulting price closer to the pre—set level, whereas greater profits
loss due to divergence form the flexible equilibrium would shift prices closer
to the equilibrium.
Next, notice that we would adjust prices contemporaneously if
(7) R(p) < R(p).
From equations 5—7 we obtain that this condition is satisfied if
(8) lr
— >k,




is the conditional expectation operator, using the information available
at the end of period t—1. is a non—stochastic term, corresponding to the
—6—expected price level at period t (expectation taking place at period ti),
Let (5denote
t
*0 (10) =E1Pt —Pt
Our producer is facing a given price level. Thus,
* A o
Eti Ptg + in ,andPt is set such as to maxImize expected profIts:
(11) Max E1(R).
Let p(c) denote the densIty function of e.Using the switching rule
obtained in equation 8 and the value of p9 in equation 69 we get from
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We pre—set the price (p°) so as to maximize expected profits. Notice that
is a parameter whose value is set by the choice of p .Direct
optimization of equation 12 reveals that whenever c follows a symmetrical
—7—distribution, the optimal choice of p° is at its "certainty equivalent"
value, such that =0,i.e.
(13) p Eti
Optimal choice of the pre—set price implies that the switching rule
(equation 8) is given by
(8')
> k.
The price of x for period t is pre—set at the end of the previous period
at its certainty—equivalence level (i.e., at the level that would maximize
profits if the value of c is zero). If the unexpected price level change
exceeds a threshold value,2 the price of x adjusts within the period to level
p' .Thethreshold value depends positively on the cost of within—the—period
price adjustment (both the fixed and the marginal cost). It depends
negatively on a measure of the cost of price divergence from its optimal value
We can now derive a measure of unexpected relative price adjustment.
From equations 6, 8' we obtain that:
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—8—If the price of x is pre—set, the shock to the relative price Is equal to
the aggregate price level shock. Allowing the price of x to adjust within the
period cushions the shock to relative prices by
(15) 1 —w =w
The greater is the cost of price divergence (112)andthe lower the marginal
cost of price adjustment, the greater the cushioning effect. To assess how
higher unexpected inflation volatility affects relatIve prIce volatIlIty let
us impose further structure on the model by assuming that c follows a normal
distribution. Let4(c)and c) denote the standard normal density
function and cumulative distribution of c, and V,adenote the variance y y
and standard deviation of y. From equation 14 we obtain that the volatility
of relative prices is:
(16) V =E1[{p—i- Et_i(p = V•[H(z) +{i-
where z =k/cy,11(z) =1—2•'t'(—z)—2•z•
Ahigher volatility of unexpected inflation (dV > 0) has two opposite
effects. The direct effect increases relative price volatility at the rate of
the increase in inflation volatility. At the same time, however, higher
inflation volatility implies that the price of x would adjust more frequently
within the period (i.e., more frequently > k).Because such an
adjustment cushions the shock to relative prices, higher inflation volatility
would indirectly work to reduce volatility. In terms of equatIon 16,
—9—dV > 0 would reduce the expression in the brackets [notice that
dH(z)> ,
c dz
and that 0 < 11(z) < 1J. From equation 16 we obtain that
____= + jH(z) -z2.(41z}{1-2}
It can be shown that3
(18) z2.(—4'(z) )<H(z) ifz > 1.36
z .(—4,'(z)) > 11(z)if z < 1,36.
Thus, for stable economies the effect of higher inflation volatility on
relative price volatility is unambiguously positive, (i.e., If a < k/1e36).
This Is because the direct volatility effect dominates the cushioning effect
of more frequent price adjustment. In terms of equation 17, both terms are
positives For economies where the volatility of inflation is high enough,
however, the second term in equation 17 is negative (i.e., If a > k/1,36).
Under certain conditions it might even dominate the first term, resulting In a
region where a higher inflation volatility accompanies a lower relative price
volatility. To obtain this result the cushioning effect w of price
adjustment should be adequately powerful. Inspection of equation 17 reveals
that higher unexpected inflation volatility would reduce relative price
volatility if and only if both the marginal cost of price adjustment are small
enough, and the inflation rate is sufficientlyvolatile.4
Using equations 6, 8' we can obtain also that price volatility Is given
by:5
—10—(19) Vi(p) =[1—H(z)].
from which we can derive that
(20) —>1
Vi(p), V_i(p)
where denotes the elasticity of y with respect to z. Higher volatility
of unexpected inflation would raise the volatflity of the price of x at a
higher rate because higher inflation volatility justifies more frequent price
dUJuLmeLLL.
4.Concluding Remarks
Our discussion demonstrates that considering the possibility of time
dependent costs of price adjustment allows us to focus on the cushioning
effect of within—the period price adjustment. This effect reduces the
magnitude of relative price volatility. Under certain conditions it might
result in a drop in relative price volatility as a result of higher inflation
volatility. These conditions seem restrictive enough to prevent aggregate
analysis from revealing the importance of the cushioning effect. Our analysis
suggests that the price behavior will vary across economies and sectors
according to the degree of competition, the costs of price adjustment, the
volatility of the inflationary process.
—11—Footnotes
1.For a recent survey of the literature on relative price variability and
inflation see Cukierman (1983). For an analysis of sticky prices due to
time—independent fixed costs of adjustment see also Mussa (1981).
2. Such a pricing rule is similar to the ad hoc pricing rules applied
previously in a macro context by Alzenman (1984) and McCallum (1977).
Unlike those previous papers, In the present context the pricing rule is
derived explicitly using an optimizing procedure.
3. Let us denote by a, b the points on the real plain defined by
(-z, 4,(z)), (z, z)). Direct inspection reveals that H(z) is the area
bounded below the standard normal density function and above the line that
passes points a and b. z2'(—z) is the area of a triangle defined by the
two tangents to 4(z) at points a and b, and by the line that passes
points a, b. Due to the shape of the normal density function,
H > q'(—z) for large z, and H < •4'(—z)for small z. It turns
out that H =z2•4'(—z) for z 1.36.
4. Notice that if c +0,uj +0.
0
5.V1(p) is the conditional variance of p, defined by
—Ei(p))2].
We use it as a volatility measure.
—12—Appendix Notation
=pricelevel at time t
Pt
=priceof good x at time t.
= = moneywage at time t.
p, p,w =logarithmsof ,p,w
p flexible equilibrium price.
iTt
=realprofits in a flexible equilibrium.
= thepre—set price of good x for period t.
=theprice of good x for period t if there Is within the
period price adjustment.
R(p) =realprofits that corresponds to price Pt•
=expectationoperator conditional on information available at
time.
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